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 “There is no subtler, no surer means of overturning the existing basis of society 
than to debauch the currency. The process engages all the hidden forces of 
economic law on the side of destruction and does it in a manner which not one man 
in a million can diagnose” - John Maynard Keynes (1920) p. 220 -  
“They had learned then how easy it is to issue it; how difficult it is to check its 
overissue; how seductively it leads to the absorption of the means of the 
workingmen and men of small fortunes; how heavily it falls on all those living on 
fixed incomes, salaries or wages; how securely it creates on the ruins of prosperity 
of all men of meagre means a class of debauched speculators, the most injurious 
class that a nation can harbour – more injurious, indeed, than professional 
criminals whom the law recognises and can throttle; how it stimulates 
overproduction at first and leaves every industry flaccid afterward; how it breaks 
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veterans (Chiimba, 2005). These events, coupled with the Zimbabwean Government’s fiscal and monetary policies, led to progressively higher rates of inflation.  The focus of this paper will be on Zimbabwe’s particular hyperinflationary episode. The crisis has its roots in Zimbabwe’s struggle for independence, which took place in the 1970s. This struggle, known as the Second Chimurenga, culminated in Zimbabwe’s declaration of Independence on April 18, 1980. The incumbent President Mugabe has repeatedly referred to the current period of Zimbabwe’s history as the Third 
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Section II: Background and Literature Review  
Background Since America severed its link with gold in the 1970s, the world has operated on fiat money. And in that time, inflation has blossomed, often at rates above 100 per cent per annum. Siklos (2000) points out that inflation is largely a phenomenon of the 20th century; and, in particular, of the post World War II decades. Hyperinflation, however, was first recorded during China’s Sung Dynasty in the 11th and 12th centuries1; and the highest hyperinflation on record is the second Hungarian hyperinflation, which occurred just after World War II. Capie (1986) observes that only paper currency allows a sufficient expansion in the money supply and/or a sufficient rise in the velocity of circulation to permit a rapid rise in prices. The rareness of paper money prior to the twentieth century explains the rare occurrence of rapid inflation episodes in this era. Today, the world is no longer reliant on the physical printing press. With the advent of electronic and virtual funds, money supply injections are no longer dependent upon the paper and ink of previous decades: creating money can take as long as it does to type the number into a bank’s accounting system. Furthermore, in the age of the internet, information (and misinformation) are immediate; and given the right audience, such information will rapidly fire the hysteria that will hype the velocity of circulation. 










Jayson Coomer 9 










Jayson Coomer 10 
observe that many modern episodes are preceded by years of chronic inflation, which eventually degenerates into hyperinflation.  
The Hyperinflationary Process Bernholz (1993) summarises the hyperinflationary process as follows: “the public restricts more and more its use of the inflating currency. First, money is no longer used as a unit of account. Moreover, the decreasing real stock of money leads to liquidity problems and furthers the substitution of the national currency by foreign currencies or by other stable stores of value. As a consequence, the real revenue received by the government from the inflation tax decreases more and more. At the same time, normal revenue from ordinary taxes diminishes because of he misallocation of resources resulting from inflation and because of the time lag between declaration of taxes and their expenditure. Since the population has meanwhile learned about the mechanisms of inflation, any expansionary effect of increasing rates of inflation is limited”. In the body of his work, Bernholz (1988, 1990, 1993) also identifies the following general characteristics of hyperinflationary episodes: 1. When the inflation begins, the real stock of money increases . 2. If the country permits a more expansionary/accommodative monetary policy than its principal trading partners, the corresponding exchange rates rise more strongly and quickly than the relative price level (under a flexible exchange rate regime). The currency becomes undervalued, and purchasing power parity does not hold. In countries with fixed exchange rate regimes, an overvaluation will develop. 3. When inflation has persisted for s me time and continues to further accelerate, the real stock of domestic money begins to fall. In the last phase of hyperinflation, it reaches a level far below the normal stock of the time before inflation. 4. Apart from a higher velocity of the inflating money, substitution takes place for a more value-stable currency. 5. The price level rises more strongly than exchange rates during the final months of hyperinflation. Undervaluation diminishes as the system moves towards purchasing power parity. The same development can take place if money supply growth relative to the corresponding trading partner ceases. 6. When a country enters into hyperinflation, the real budget deficit increases. 7. “The consolidated budget deficit of all government agencies including state-owned firms, amounts to a high fraction of total government expenditures and is mainly financed by money creation”. 8. The inflation itself causes a substantial part of the deficit, due to time lags in tax collection, as well as time lags between collection and spending. 9. The government and the central bank lose all credibility with the population. 
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Finally, and closely linked to Sargent’s (1982) credible change in policies, the use of game theory in the approach to economic policy has allowed researchers to analyse the concept of credibility (Persson and Tabellini, 1990). However, of most relevance to this paper is the fiscal role of inflation. While it is not disputed that inflation is a result of money creation, and is therefore a monetary phenomenon; the underlying cause for money creation itself is the need to finance a fiscal deficit. 
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Section III: Methodology  
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the purpose of this paper is not to dispute the inflation rates quoted by the IMF: the rates quoted herein are as quoted in the statistical appendices published by the Fund. 
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Section IV: The Zimbabwean Hyperinflation  
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their statutory reserves into “subsidized export credits” (on-lending to exporters at subsidized rates (IMF Staff Report, 2001). The equivalent of about 30 percent of reserve money was released through this scheme, at an interest rate of 30 percent (compared to a bank rate of 56 percent, and year-on-year inflation of 54 percent). This accelerated broad money growth from 30 percent in 1999 to 60 percent in 2000 (IMF Staff Report, 2001). Also in early August, the RBZ announced a 24 percent devaluation of the Zimbabwe dollar, introducing a crawling peg exchange regime. Under the new arrangement, periodic adjustments of the exchange rate would be announced, based on inflation differentials with trading partners. Despite subsequent adjustments, however, the RBZ failed to adequately adjust the exchange rate, and the currency was still significantly overvalued by year end, with the parallel market about 25 percent more depreciated than the official rate (IMF Staff Report, 2001).  Severe shortages of fuel, electricity, and other essential imports and a backlog of private service remittances continued throughout 2000, and the stock of external payment arrears had reached about US$500 million at end-September (including arrears to the World Bank, the African Development Bank, and the European Investment Bank that prompted suspension of disbursements). The public sector owed approximately three-quarters of these arrears (IMF Staff Report, 2000). By mid-November, usable foreign reserves remained critically low at US$12.3 million, or “about 3 days of projected 2000 imports of goods and services” (IMF Staff Report, 2000, p. 11), although this had risen to US$22 million by the end of the year (see Table 1).  
Table 1: Zimbabwe's International Reserves, 1998 - 2004 (in millions of US dollars, unless otherwise 
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buy shares on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange or real estate (IMF Staff Report, 2001). Negative real interest rates also encouraged an attitude of “buy now” rather than wait, further contributing to the acceleration of inflation (IMF Staff Report, 2001). The authorities continued to introduce new exchange measures, intended to mitigate the loss of competitiveness and curb the activities of the parallel market. In June 2001, the RBZ increased the surrender requirement for all exporters (with the exception of the tobacco exporters) to 40 percent from 25 percent (IMF Staff Report, 2001). The IMF observed that given the wide spread between the official and black market exchange rates, the 40 percent surrender was an effective tax on exporters (IMF Staff Report, 2001).  Despite the Supreme Court interdict against further land acquisition, the government continued to implement its fast-track program. In July 2001, the government increased the amount of land to be resettled from 5 million hectares to 8.3 million hectares, nearly 70 percent of the large-scale commercial farming land (IMF Staff Report, 2001). In that same month, the Finance Minister, Simba Makoni, publicly acknowledged the crisis, admitting to the complete depletion of foreign reserves, and warning of the possibility of severe food shortages (Timeline: Zimbabwe, 2009). Later in the year, the government would go on to launch an appeal for US$360 million of humanitarian assistance (IMF Staff Report, 2001). 
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loss of output, as “large-scale commercial farming [had] been severely disrupted” and “the newly resettled farmers [lacked] the knowledge and material support to utilize the land efficiently” (IMF Staff Report, 2003, p. 5). Parliament approved President Mugabe’s November 2001 amendments to the Land Acquisition Act on May 8, 2002. Work on these farms was ordered to be suspended immediately, and eviction orders were issued giving owners three months to vacate their properties, setting August 8, 2002 as the deadline for compulsory acquisition (IMF Staff Report, 2003). In August, the eviction orders were ruled invalid by the High Court, because the government did not notify banks holding mortgage titles. In response, the Land Acquisition Act was amended, and approved by parliament in September, validating the eviction orders, and increasing the penalties for non-compliance (IMF Staff Report, 2003). 
Nominal interest rates continued to be kept at artificially low levels; and became increasingly negative in real terms as inflation rose. Broad money growth accelerated to 165 percent in 2002 from 103 percent in 2001, as effective lowering of reserve 
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requirements led to the rapid expansion of credit to the private sector; these concessional facilities peaked at Z$42 billion in July. Contrary to the government’s expectations, the loose monetary stance failed to generate expansion in the production sector; and virtually no productive investment took place. Rather, prices rose rapidly, the black market rate continued to depreciate, financial savings grew increasingly less attractive, and the more rapid asset substitution effect continued to drive up the price bubbles in real estate, stocks, and consumer durables (IMF Staff Report, 2003). In mid-November 2002, the price controls on selected food items that were introduced in October 2001 were broadened in scope, and extended to a six-month price freeze. With this move, nearly 70 percent of the items in the consumer price index (CPI) basket became subject to administered pricing; making official inflationary figures unreliable. The controlled prices were often below production costs, forcing many companies to close, contributing to a decline in employment in the formal sector. As the IMF mission observed, this main impact of the controls was to drive up prices in the informal markets (IMF Staff Report, 2003). At the same time, the government attempted to clamp down on the parallel market exchange rate, the premium on which had reached as high as 2,900 percent during the year. Exchange controls were tightened, and foreign exchange bureaus were closed, leaving banks as the only authorised dealers in foreign exchange. Surrender requirements were further increased to 50 percent, while the balance retained by exporters had to be deposited with the RBZ, with its utilization “limited to a priority list and subject to RBZ approval” (p. 14). As a result, the RBZ saw its inflow of foreign exchange slow as most transactions moved to the parallel market, which appreciated slightly as the majority of export receipts were sold on the parallel market (IMF Staff Report, 2003). In late 2002, Agriculture Minister Joseph Made declared the “land-grab” to be over, stating that the government had seized 35m acres of land from white farmers” (Timeline: Zimbabwe, 2009). By the end of the year, almost all white-owned farms had been designated for acquisition by the State (IMF Staff Report, 2003). By the beginning of 
2003, the majority of farmers had left their farms in compliance with the eviction orders (IMF 
Staff Report, 2003). The decline in agricultural production began to negatively affect the 
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the lodging of securities as collateral; and in April, the repurchase rate was raised to 56 percent (IMF Staff Report, 2003).  In addition to these policy changes, with effect March 1, 2003, the official exchange rate was devalued to Z$824 for US$1; and consequently, the parallel market to official market spread for March narrowed to some 60 percent (IMF Staff Report, 2003). Policies for surrender requirements and the use of permitted export receipts remained unchanged. As the inflow of export receipts to the RBZ dried up, parastatal companies (including the national electricity supplier, ZESA, and the national fuel supplier, NOCZIM) were forced to purchase foreign currency on the parallel market to pay their external arrears. In response to this demand, the parallel market began depreciate rapidly: reaching Z$2,400 per US dollar at the end of May, compared with Z$1500 per US dollar in late April (IMF Staff Report, 2003). On May 6, further price adjustments, including an easing of price controls, were announced (IMF Staff Report, 2003). Prices for subsidized commodities continued to be controlled; and prices for essential goods were monitored, with producers having to “make their case for price increased to the Ministry of Industry and International Trade (MIIT) with profit margins not exceeding 20 percent” (p. 11). All other prices were liberalized, but made subject to surveillance by the Ministry of Industry and Trade, as well as unspecified ‘corrective measures to prevent profiteering’ (IMF Staff Report, 2003). At the end of May, RBZ Governor Tsumba went on leave until his retirement at the expiration of his term at the end of July (IMF Staff Report, 2003). As can be seen from Table 4, Tsumba left a legacy of mone  creation; by the end of 2003, broad money (M3) had risen to 3,240.3 billion dollars, from 56.6 billion dollars at the end of 1998. 
Table 4: Zimbabwe Money Supply, 1998 - 2003 (in billions of Zimbabwe dollars) (IMF, 2005, p. 92) 










Jayson Coomer 31 










Jayson Coomer 32 
The Turning Point (2004)  The RBZ raised the interest rate sharply in the first quarter of 2004, and it reached a peak of 5,242 percent p.a. in March 2004. As a result of monetary tightening, inflation, which had increased to a peak of 623 percent in January 2004, decelerated sharply to around 130 percent at the end of 2004 (RBZ, 2007) (Kairiza, 2009). The sudden return to high interest rates sparked a liquidity crisis in the financial institutions, some of which were unable to raise depositors’ funds. The fall of Century Discount House, a subisidiary of ENG Asset Management Companies, triggered a contagion amongst many indigenous banks (Makoni, 2006) (Kairiza, 2009).  The new governor also instituted a managed foreign exchange tender (“auction”) system. Under the auction system, foreign exchange from surrender requirements, FCA liquidations and other sources was auctioned twice a week by the RBZ. Only priority bids were accepted, and allocations were made at the bidding price starting from the highest accepted bid. Suppliers received the average rate paid by bidders (IMF Staff Report, 2004). At the same time, Gono also changed the surrender requirements for exporters: requiring the surrender of 25 percent of gross export receipts at the official rate of Z$824/US$1, and a further 25 percent to the “auction.” The remaining half could be retained in an FCA for a maximum of 21 days, after which any unused foreign exchange was surrendered for tender (IMF Staff Report, 2004). These new exchange rate policies brought foreign transactions back into the official channels, causing usable gross official reserves to increase to US$76 million at end-May 2004, from US$18 million at end-2003 (IMF Staff Report, 2004). In May 2003, the majority of the price controls were removed, and the fuel market was partially liberalised in August (IMF Staff Report, 2004). As can be seen from Figure 1, inflation began to slow in response to these measures. However, domestic producers and exporters were hard hit by the high interest rates and substantially overvalued official exchange rate. The RBZ began to involve itself in quasi-fiscal activities3, arguing that it was aiding suffering industries by doing so. As Kairiza (2009) points out, these quasi-fiscal activities undid all previous successes in the inflation battle, and firmly set the country on the road toward hyperinflation. Interest rates were lowered sharply around the end-2004 (IMF Staff Report, 2005), and the RBZ began to compulsorily convert any surplus in the money market at the close of each day into new ‘open market’ treasury bills with long maturities (of up to 2 years) at deeply negative real interest rates (nominal effective rates of 70-100 percent) (IMF Staff Report, 2004). In addition, statutory reserve requirements on deposits were increased to 60 percent for commercial banks and lending houses (Muñoz, 2007).                                                         3 Quasi-fiscal activity: “an operation or measure carried out by a central bank or other public financial 
institution with an effect that can, in principle, be duplicated by budgetary measures in the form of an 
explicit tax, subsidy, or direct expenditure and that has or may have an impact on the financial 
operations of the central bank, other public financial institutions, or government” Mackenzie, G. A., & 
Stella, P. (1996). Quasi-Fiscal Operations of Public Financial Institutions. IMF Occasional Paper No. 
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Figure 1. Zimbabwe CPI Inflation, 2003 - 2005 (IMF, 2005, p. 8) 
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The government continued to lash out against the business community, gazetting its Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Bill in late June, which would require every business to have at least 51 percent of its shares held by indigenous persons (Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Bill of 2007). The government announced further price control, halving all prices. The price controls resulted in a run on shops (TIMELINE: Chronology of Zimbabwe's Economic Crisis, 2007). Over the rest of 2007, manufacturing output fell by more than 50 percent (Coltart, A Decade of Suffering in Zimbabwe, 2008). In August, the RBZ publicised a slowing of inflation to an annualized 6,592.8 percent, from 7,634.8 percent in July. The government credited the price freeze for the drop; and announced a further freeze on wages (TIMELINE: Chronology of Zimbabwe's Economic Crisis, 2007). By September 2007, despite the price controls, the black market in Zimbabwe was once again booming. According to the press, “people previously employed for a paltry US$11 a month (ZW$2 million) a month were able to turn as much as US$166 (ZW$30m) just through black market trading” (Lee J. , 2009). The final run of hyperinflation was beginning, as can be seen in Figure 2.  
Figure 2. Zimbabwe Inflation, CPI annual change (IMF, 2009, p. 5) 
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The Climactic Dollarization (2008 – 2009)  By January 2008, the money supply had reached $100 trillion of the newly revalued Zimbabwean Dollars. And on 21 January 2008, RBZ Governor Gono reported that the money supply had been increased to Z$170 trillion, and that he expected that number to reach Z$800 trillion by the following week (Lee J. , 2009). 
Table 5. Zimbabwe: Selected Economic Indicators (2007 - 09) (IMF, 2009, p. 19) 










Jayson Coomer 39 
















































According to Martin Rupiya, a professor of war and security studies at the University of Zimbabwe, "The regime is surviving by printing money. At this stage there is no other way" (Lee J. , 2009) Inflation reached 417,823 percent in March; as Zimbabweans returned to the harmonized presidential, senate, and parliamentary polls.  The ruling ZANU-PF party lost in all three elections, losing its majority in the legislature for the first time. The presidential ballot required a runoff between Mugabe (with 43.2 percent of the original vote) and Tsvangirai (with 47.9 percent of the original vote), as neither had the outright majority. The run-off election never materialized, as Tsvangirai withdrew “citing the high level of violence against his supporters which was inimical to a free and fair poll” (Kairiza, 2009). Mugabe was sworn in to his sixth term of office (Timeline: Zimbabwe, 2009). By July, shops were charging double the cash price for a cheque transaction, due to the time delay in the clearing of the cheque. Meanwhile, bank withdrawals were limited to ZW$100 billion, which was less than the cost of a loaf of bread (Lee J. , 2009). The RBZ introduced the 100-billion-dollar banknote in an attempt to alleviate the strain on the printing presses (Timeline: Zimbabwe, 2009).  By the end of July, the Institute of Commercial Management reported the parallel exchange rate to the British Pound Sterling was at Z$1.2 trillion to one (Lee J. , 2009), which is at odds with the rate quoted by the United Nations (see Table 6)4. Hyperinflation was still being fuelled by the RBZ’s quasi-fiscal activities, which had caused a rapid increase in the banks’ deposits with the RBZ, and thereby rapid                                                         4 However, the UN exchange rate suffers from a time lag, as it was set by the UN at a date, for a period. The rate was only revised in August. 
 
Table 6. Zimbabwe Parallel Exchange Rate, 2005 - 
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increases in local currency M3 (includes local currency-denominated cash in circulation and deposits with the banking system). However, the printing of physical notes was unable to match the expansion of local currency M3, which led to cash shortages and “a significant divergence between the parallel cash and electronic transaction exchange rates”. In the third quarter of 2008, real money demand and the parallel market exchange rates collapsed in response to the still-accelerating inflation. As a result, by the end of the year, reserve money declined to an equivalent of about US$7 million (at the UN exchange rate of Z$35 quadrillion (1015) per US dollar) and local currency-denominated M3 declined to US$6 million. In contrast, foreign currency deposits were estimated at around US$300 million at the end of 2008 (IMF Staff Report, 2009). Between January and December 2008, the money supply growth rate rose from 81,143 per annum, to 658 billion percent per annum (Lee J. , 2009). In effect, the extreme hyperinflation left the local currency defunct as the economy dollarized in late 2008. Inflation is estimated to have peaked in September 2008 at about 500 billion (109) percent5. From that time, the pricing of goods and services shifted to foreign currency units (mostly, the U.S. Dollar and rand), and the local currency virtually disappeared from circulation (IMF Staff Report, 2009). As can be seen from Figure 3, Zimbabwe dollar transactions going through banks in the form of cheques and direct transfers had effectively ceased by January 2009. 
Figure 3. Volume of Transactions in Zimbabwe Dollars (IMF, 2009, p. 10) 
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Section V: Common Features in History  
The Hyperinflations of History The first recorded hyperinflation to meet the Cagan definition was the French Assignat episode that followed the French Revolution. Capie (1986) includes the episodes that took place in America during the War of Independence and the American Civil War. These episodes are somewhat unusual, as the inflation was not felt across all the states in the same way: rather, the Cagan definition was met in selected states at certain times, as opposed to the country as a whole. These three pre-20th century episodes have received a large amount of academic attention; due in part to the fact that they were the first episodes of their kind, but also due to the amount of time that academics have had to study them. Accounts of these episodes, therefore, feature very strongly in the comparison undertaken in this section. 
                                                        6 Geometric average of quarter. Serbia with Montenegro: New Yugoslav Republic. 
Table 1: Hyperinflations of the 20th Century 
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The hyperinflationary episodes that took place in the 20th Century are summarised in Table 1, as amended from the list produced by Berholz & Kugler (2009). The bulk of the available academic literature focuses on the Great Inflations of the 1920s and 1940s. These episodes also feature very strongly in the comparison. As Fischer et al. (2002) observe, there were no hyperinflations between 1947 and 1984. In the modern decades, hyperinflation reappeared in Latin America, Africa and Eastern Europe. There is much less coverage of these episodes in academia: potentially due to linguistic difficulties, as the research for this paper was confined to papers published in English. However, some of the earlier Latin American inflations, particularly the Bolivian inflation, have many useful accounts available. The Eastern European hyperinflations are very recent, and therefore not many studies have been undertaken in their regard.  Fischer et al. (2002) “exclude episodes lasting less than two months because many transition economies, especially those in the former Soviet Union, suffered at least one month of more than 50 percent inflation when price controls were lifted. Since these episodes were more in the nature of a price level adjustment than an ongoing process of high inflation, [they] have changed the definition to exclude them” (p. 7). 










Jayson Coomer 44 
overvaluation, but stated that “political factors, including at the highest level, blocked a change” (IMF Staff Report, 2003, p. 20). The overvalued official rate proved an alternate source of revenue, as the RBZ exploited the spread between the official and parallel rates. However, despite efforts to force the inflow of foreign currency through official channels, most transactions shifted toward the parallel market: making the government almost entirely dependent on money creation. At this point, the public had begun to use alternative forms of currency; and prices continued to increase at higher rates as the velocity of circulation drove the inflation. The consequent erosion of the inflation tax base lead to price controls and crackdowns on informal markets. This then resulted in the increasing of premiums on available goods on the parallel market, sparking even higher rates of inflation once the controls were lifted. At the same time, money was being created ever more rapidly, as the state attempted to maintain the real value of seigniorage. Economic agents had begun to benefit from speculating during the hyperinflation, and the newly rich now sought to prolong the episode: allowing them to take further advantage of negative real rates of interest, as well as effective mini-monopolies of supply due to the commodity shortages caused by the inflation. Inevitably, the hyperinflation spiralled to such extreme levels that the depreciating currency was abandoned as a means of transaction; the monetary authorities were stripped of their seigniorage power as the currency they print was no longer accepted, and the economy self-dollarized. This dollarization was later officialised by the fiscal authorities; when tax collections were effected in foreign currency.  The following key features of Zimbabwe’s hyperinflation are identified: 
• A large fiscal deficit, causing a loss in investor confidence, existed before and throughout the episode. 
• Zimbabwe’s ideological government, with its populist political and economic policies and denial of money supply growth as the root cause of the inflation, caused and perpetuated the inflation. 
• An inefficient tax collection system did not permit fiscal adjustment in response to higher expenditure requirements. 
• The cut-off from foreign credit led to the reliance on the printing press and domestic borrowing. 
• The rapid inflation led to capital flight, and the emerging of asset pricing bubbles as the population sought to hedge itself against the inflation. 
• Hedging led to profiteering, as the continuing inflation allowed economic agents with access to banking capital to invest in assets, whilst benefiting from the inflationary erosion of their borrowed funds. It was then in their interest to prolong the inflation. 
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Of course, it is accepted that the presence of large budget deficits is a common factor without exception: without a fiscal deficit to finance, there would be no need to print money. Of more interest, however, are the other key features observed in the Zimbabwean episode. 










Jayson Coomer 46 










Jayson Coomer 47 
understood inflation and warned against its dangers (Bomberger & Makinen, 1983). However, when the Central Bank objected to the vast numbers of Treasury Bills being issued to finance these expenditures, the Allied Commission, under the influence of the Soviets, ignored their objections. Here again, it seems that the Soviets were happy to see inflation proceed and destroy the middle class (Capie F. , 1986). It should be noted that hyperinflation generally has the effect of eliminating the middle class, whether or not a government intends it. In the Zimbabwean situation, the government’s aim was to reduce the economic power held by the white minority, which has been accomplished. One could argue that the ruling party saw the damaging effect of inflation on the lower classes as simply a necessary cost. It should be noted, however, that the rural lower class has always operated largely on subsistence farming; and, as such, are sheltered to some extent from the ravaging effects of hyperinflation. The real sufferers in the lower classes were the urban-dwelling poor, and the middle-class white population. Given that the voting stronghold of the ruling party was always the rural vote, and that the urban vote has traditionally had stronger opposition; the hyperinflation could be seen as an attack against the opposition. In most of these episodes, it is observed that the greatest sufferers during hyperinflation are the ruling government’s opposition. However, it is unlikely that these consequences were fully foreseen by the Zimbabwean authorities. Rather than hyperinflation being the goal of the land redistribution process, it is more probable that the episode was the result of the agricultural disruption, followed by a number of successive fiscal shocks, without corresponding fiscal adjustment. The necessary fiscal adjustment should have included adjustments in the tax system and collection process: problems with taxation have often left countries with no choice but to print currency. 
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then requisition funds. According to Capie (1986), only 6 percent of the required revenue was raised in this way, due to public opposition. Some of the funds raised were obtained by borrowing abroad and “several European countries, notably France and Spain, made gifts; but in total this came to less than 20 per cent of revenue” (p. 122). The Continental Congress financed the balance by printing paper money in greater quantities. This led to the rapid depreciation of the currency (the Continental), hyperinflationary conditions, and the coining of the phrase “not worth a Continental”. Inadequate taxation was also a primary cause of the Great Inflations of the 1920s: not only were taxation revenues insufficient to fund the planned and actual expenditures, but the tax systems were inefficient to a point where the costs of collection were greater than the real value of the tax collected. The League of Nations is said to have stated that their technical advisors ‘were powerless to repress the inefficient accountancy, the slowness with which arrears in taxes were collected and even the wholesale corruption…’ (Capie F. , 1986, p. 127). During the Greek hyperinflation, however, we see part of the problem lying with the type of tax system in place. Makinen (1986) notes that the Greek tax system was not based on ad valorem taxes, which made it difficult for tax revenue to keep abreast with inflation. In the Zimbabwean situation, there were widespread inefficiencies in tax collection. The government took steps to address this by reconstituting the tax collection service into the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (ZIMRA) in 2001 (Statutory Instrument No.21B of 2001). However, by this point, the Keynes-Tanzi effect had already rendered the tax system inefficient, almost by default. Furthermore, when the government had attempted to increase taxes in order to finance the war veteran packages and the military expenditures in the DRC, the move had been met with opposition and mass protest (Kairiza, 2009). The Zimbabwean government reacted to the protests by monetising the debt: the problem may not have been the tax system, but rather the government’s inability to enforce its tax reforms. However, the deficit created by a lack of efficient tax collection, whilst problematic in the long term, can and should be covered temporarily by sources other than the printing press. The problem only becomes pressing when the authorities have no viable alternatives. 
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political competition for power” (p. 279). At the same time, the early 1980s saw the world economy as a whole facing a worsening economic climate, with “high interest rates, falling commodities prices, and tight credit” (p. 279). On top of the political crisis, Bolivian access to international capital markets had dried up by the end of 1980; and the World Bank and the IMF ceased lending money in the following year. The problem arose because Bolivia had begun to show growing fiscal deficits (including losses of government-owned firms) in the second half of the 1970s, which it had financed with foreign borrowings. Apart from the global fall in available credit, Bolivia’s increasing foreign debt came with an accompanying increase in service costs, which also made it difficult to obtain further foreign financing. The situation culminated in a foreign exchange crisis in March 1982; and the consequent devaluation of the Bolivian Peso sparked a cost-push rise in inflation due to rising import costs. The deficit continued to increase; and because foreign financing was no longer available, the Bolivian government was forced to finance the deficit by printing money (Bernholz P. , 1988). Once a government has resorted to the printing press, it does not take long for its electorate to become aware of the inflationary effects of money creation. As the situation worsens, the depreciating currency is no longer seen as a store of value, and capital flight begins to take place. 
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Germany, Austria also experienced “flight from the crown” as the public transferred its wealth from the depreciating crown into foreign currency and real assets (Sargent, 1982).  During the Chinese hyperinflation, the official currencies were discarded “both as units of account and as stores of value” (p. 244) as a result of the continuous inflation: instead, businesses and individuals “customarily held reserves in United States dollars, Chinese silver dollars, gold, short-term notes, or readily disposable commodities such as rice and flour” (Campbell & Tullock, 1954, p. 241). The Chinese also turned to the stock market as a store of value: monthly turnover on the exchange increased to around 10 million shares in 1940, from about 1.5 million shares in 1937 (Campbell & Tullock, 1954). In the same way, during Zimbabwe’s hyperinflation, the IMF observes pricing bubbles in the equity stocks and real estate, as well as a soaring parallel rate as the population began to deal increasingly in foreign currency.  As the use of the local currency begins to diminish, the inflation tax base begins to contract. Up and until this point, the monetary authorities could maintain the real value of their seigniorage revenue by increasing the rate at which they print money. However, seigniorage revenue can only be earned provided that the currency is still used in circulation. Once the currency is not as accepted, the real level of seigniorage revenue begins to fall. In order to prevent this from happening, the authorities often attempt to slow the depreciation of the currency by implementing price and exchange controls. History has shown that these do not slow, but rather propel inflation. 
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A similar situation occurred during the American Civil War, when the Southern government enacted price controls as a direct response to public protests of high prices, ‘caused’ by speculators and extortioners. However, as the controls grew more unrealistic, they collapsed (Lerner E. M., 1955). In Austria, the flight from the crown diminished the resources that the government could command by printing money (Sargent, 1982). In order to prevent the flight to foreign currency, Austria centralized the trading of foreign exchange at the Devisenzentrale. There were severe penalties for violating the strict exchange controls, and informers were rewarded (Bordes 1924). In spite of these restrictions, Sargent (1982) asserts that during 1921 and 1922, Austrian citizens were both holding large amounts of foreign currencies, and transacting with them. In terms of historical context, the Zimbabwean situation is just the most recent episode to illustrate the ineffectiveness of price controls. It is suggested that the public is inherently aware of the ineffectiveness of price controls as a long-term measure. When a government body announces that price controls are the solution to an inflation problem; each citizen is faced with an ethical dilemma: either comply in the hope that all will follow suit, or break the price control in order to reap the profits that the otherwise-compliant have sacrificed. When the Governor of the Zimbabwean Reserve Bank suggested that the only solution to the crisis was a firm social contract; the public should have and did remain unconvinced. Such a contract would require each and every player to commit to a common rule. When the proponents of this contract have preceded their announcement with mismanagement and corruption, it is almost inevitable that the public will choose to break with price controls:: causing everyone to lose when the inflation returns worse than before.  










Jayson Coomer 52 










Jayson Coomer 53 










Jayson Coomer 54 










Jayson Coomer 55 










Jayson Coomer 56 
 
Bibliography Abel, A., Dornbusch, R., Huizinga, J., & Marcus, A. (1979). Money Demand During Hyperinflation. Journal of Monetary Economics (5), 97-104. Akcay, O., Alper, C., & Ozmucur, S. (1996). Budget Deficit, Money Supply and 
Inflation: Evidence from Low and High Frequency Data for Turkey. Bogazici University, Department of Economics. Aldcroft, H. (1977). From Versailles to Wall Street 1919-1929. London: Allen Lane. Amani Trust. (1998). Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum. Retrieved October 28, 2009 from A Consolidated Report on the Food Riots: 19 - 23 January 1998: http://www.hrforumzim.com/members_reports/foodriots98/food9801.htm Barro, R. J. (1970). Inflation, the Payments Period and the Demand for Money. 
Journal of Political Economy (78), 1228-1263. BBC News. (2007, June 22). BBC News|US says Zimbabwe change is afoot. Retrieved December 10, 2009 from BBC News: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6229284.stm Berend, T., & Ránki, G. (1979). Underdevelopment and Economic Growth. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó. Bernholz, P. (1989). Currency Competition, Inflation, Gresham's Law and Exchange Rate. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) , 145 (3), 465-488. Bernholz, P. (1988). Hyperinflation and Currency Reform in Bolivia: Studied from a General Perspective. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 
(JITE) (144), 747-771. Bernholz, P. (1993). Necessary and Sufficient Conditions to End Hyperinflations. In G. Radnitzky, & H. Bouillon (Eds.), Government: Servant or Master? (pp. 141-170). Amsterdam and Atlanta: Rodopi Publishers. Bernholz, P., & Kugler, P. (2009). The Success of Currency Reforms to End Great Inflations: An Empirical Analysis of 34 High Inflations. German Economic Review , 
10 (2), 165-175. Blinder, A. (1987). Credit Rationing and Effective Supply Failures. Economic 
Journal (97), 327-352. Bohl, M. T., & Siklos, P. L. (2002). The Stock Market and the Business Cycle in 
Periods of Deflation, (Hyper-) Inflation, and Political Turmoil: Germany 1913 - 










Jayson Coomer 57 
Braudel, F. (1981). Civilization and Capitalism, Vol. 1, The Structure of Everyday 
Life. London: Collins. Braumann, B. (2000, May). Real Effects of High Inflation. IMF Working Paper 
WP/00/85 . International Monetary Fund - Western Hemisphere Department. Bresciani-Turroni, C. (1937). The Economics of Inflation. London: George Allen & Unwin LTD. Bruno, M. (1991). High Inflation and the Nominal Anchors of an Open Economy. 
Essays in International Finance No. 183 . Bruno, M., & Fischer, S. (1990). Seigniorage, Operating Rules, and the High Inflation Trap. The Quarterly Journal of Economics , 353-374. Burdekin, R., & Burkett, P. (1992). Money, Credit and Wages in Hyperinflation: Post-World War I Germany. Economic Enquiry (30), 479-495. Burdekin, R., & Wang, F. (1994). A Novel End to the Big Inflation in China: How the 
Communists Used Market Forces to Restore Price Stability in 1950. Claremont McKenna College and Claremont Graduate School. unpublished. Cagan, P. (1972). The Channels of Monetary Effects on Interest Rates. New York: Columbia University Press. Cagan, P. (1956). The Monetary Dynamics of Hyperinflation. In M. Friedman (Ed.), Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money (pp. 25-117). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Campbell, C. D., & Tullock, G. C. (1954). Hyperinflation in China, 1937-49. The 
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 62, No. 3 , 236-245. Canto, V. A. (1985). Monetary Policy, 'Dollarization,' and Parallel Market Exchange Rates: The Case of the Dominican Republic. Journal of International 
Money and Finance, 4 , 507-521. Capie, F. (1986). Co ditions in which Very Rapid Inflation has Appeared. 
Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 24 (pp. 115-168). North-Holland: Elsevier-Science Publishers B.V. Capie, F. H. (Ed.). (1991). Major Inflations in History. Aldershot, Hants, England: Edgard Publishing. Cardenas, E., & Manns, C. (1989). Inflacion y Estabilizacion Monetaria en Mexico durante la Revolucion. El Trimestre Economico , 56, 55-79. Charemza, W. W., & Ghatak, S. (1990). Demand for Money in a Dual-Currency, Quantity-Constrained Economy: Hungary and Poland, 1956-1985. The Economic 










Jayson Coomer 58 
Chiimba, R. (2005). Land Reform in Zimbabwe 2000-2002, negative and positive 
effects on the Zimbabwean economy. University of Pretoria, Faculty of Economic and Management Sciences. Pretoria: University of Pretoria. Chitiyo, T. K. (2000, May). CCR vol.9 no.1. Retrieved October 28, 2009 from Land Violence and Compensation: Reconceptualising Zimbabwe's Land and War Veterans' Debate: http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/two/9_1/zimbabwe.html Chou, S.-H. (1963). The Chinese Inflation, 1937-1949. New York and London: Columbia University Press. Coltart, D. (2008). A Decade of Suffering in Zimbabwe - Economic Collapse and Political Repression under Robert Mugabe. Cato Journal: Development Policy 
Analysis No. 5 . Coltart, D. (2008). A Decade of Suffering in Zimbabwe. Centre for Global Liberty 
and Prosperity Development Policy Analysis (5), 1-21. Coorey, S., Clausen, J. R., Funke, N., Muñoz, S., & Ould-Abdallah, B. (2007, April). Lessons from High Inflation Episodes for Stabilizing the Economy in Zimbabwe. 
IMF Working Paper WP/07/99 . International Monetary Fund - African Department. Cukierman, A. S. (1988). Rapid Inflation: Deliberate Policy or Miscalculation? 
Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 29 (pp. 11-76). North-Holland. Cukierman, A., Edwards, S., & Tabellini, G. (1992). Seigniorage and Political Instability. American Economic Review 82 , 537-555. Cukierman, A., Kalaitzidakis, P., Summers, L., & Webb, S. (1993). Central Bank Independence, Growth, Investment and Real Rates. Carnegie-Rochester 
Conference Series on Public Policy. 39, pp. 95-140. Amsterdam: North-Holland. Domaç, I., & Yücel, E. M. (2004). What Triggers Inflation in Emerging Market 
Economies? Policy Research Working Paper WPS3376, World Bank. Dornbusch, R. (1992). Monetary Problems of Post-Commission: Lessons from the End of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Weltwirtschafliches Archiv (128), 391-424. Dornbusch, R., & Edwards, S. (1992). The Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin 
America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Dornbusch, R., & Fischer, S. (1993). Moderate Inflation. The World Bank 










Jayson Coomer 59 
Fischer, S. (1994). Russia and the Soviet Union Then and Now. In The Transition 
in Eastern Europe - Country Studies (pp. 221-257). Fischer, S. (1982). Seigniorage and the Case for a National Money. Journal of 
Political Economy , 90 (2). Fischer, S., & Easterly, W. (1990). The Economics of the Government Budget Constraint. The World Bank Research Observer, Vol. 5, No. 2 , 127-142. Fischer, S., Sahay, R., & Végh, C. (2002, November). Modern Hyper- and High Inflations. IMF Working Paper WP/02/197 [corrected: 1/31/03] . International Monetary Fund - Research Department. Fisher, W. C. (1913). The Tabular Standard in Massachusetts History. Quarterly 
Journal of Economics , 27, 417-420. De Mortibus Persecutorum. (1871). The Works of Lactantius , II , 164. (W. Fletcher, Trans.) Edinburgh. Frenkel, J. A. (1976a). A Monetary Approach to the Exchange Rate: Doctrinal Aspects and Empirical Evidence. Scandinavian Journal of Economics (78), 200-224. Frenkel, J. A. (1980). Exchange Rates, Prices and Money: Lessons from the 1920's. Intewar Macroeconomics from the Perspective of the 1970's, Vol. 70, No. 2 , 235-242. Frenkel, J. A. (1979). Further Evidence on Expectations and the Demand for Money during the German Hyperinflation. Journal of Monetary Economics (5), 81-96. Frenkel, J. A. (1975). Inflation and the Formation of Expectations. Journal of 
Monetary Economics (1), 403-421. Frenkel, J. A. (1976b). Some Dynamic Aspects of the Welfare Cost of Inflationary Finance. In R. I. McKinnon (Ed.), Money and Finance in Economic Growth and 










Jayson Coomer 60 
Ghei, N., & Kamin, S. B. (1996, September). The Use of the Parallel Market Rate as a Guide to Setting the Official Rate. International Finance Discussion Papers No. 
564 . Board of Governers of the Federal Reserve System. Graham, F. (1930). Exchange, Prices, and Production in Hyper-inflation: Germany, 
1920-1923. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Haggard, S., & Kaufman, R. (1989). The Politics of Stabilization and Structural Adjustment. In J. Sachs (Ed.), Developing Country Debt and the World Economy (pp. 263-274). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Hamilton, E. (1965). American Treasure and the Price Revolution in Spain 1501-
60. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. Hamilton, E. J. (1977). The Role of War in Modern Inflation. Journal of Economic 
History , XXXVII (1), 13-19. Hamilton, E. (1936). Prices and Wages at Paris under John Law's System. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics , 51, 42-70. Hanke, S. H. (2006, May 26). Inflation Nation. Retrieved June 2, 2009 from CATO Institute: http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=6406 Hanke, S. H. (2008, July 21). Kill Central Bank to Fix Inflation in Zimbabwe. Retrieved June 2, 2009 from CATO Institute : http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=9553 Harlow, R. V. (1929). Aspects of Revolutionary Finance 1775-1783. The American 
Historical Review, Vol. 35, No. 1 , 46-68. Harris, S. (1930). The Assignats. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. Hazlett, R. (1959). Forward to "Fiat Money Inflation in France". In F. Capie (Ed.), 
Major Inflations in History.  Holtfrerich, C.-L. (1980). Die Deutsche Inflation. Berlin and New York: de Gruyter. Holtfrerich, C.-L. (1976). Domestic and International Factors in a Case of 
Hyperinflation. Paper, University of Berlin. Holtfrerich, C.-L. (1986). The Determinants of Monetary Expansion. In The 
German Inflation 1914-23: Causes and Effects in International Perspective (pp. 108-137). Berlin & New York: Walter de Gruyter. Huang, A. C. (1948). The Inflation in China. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 










Jayson Coomer 61 
IMF Staff Report. (2000). ZIMBABWE: Staff Report for the 2000 Article IV 
Consultation. International Monetary Fund. Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund. IMF Staff Report. (2001). ZIMBABWE: Staff Report for the 2001 Article IV 
Consultation. International Monetary Fund. Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund. IMF Staff Report. (2003). ZIMBABWE: Staff Report for the 2003 Article IV 
Consultation. International Monetary Fund. Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund. IMF Staff Report. (2004). ZIMBABWE: Staff Report for the 2004 Article IV 
Consultation. Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund. IMF Staff Report. (2005). ZIMBABWE: Staff Report for the 2005 Article IV 
Consultation. Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund. IMF Staff Report. (2009). ZIMBABWE: Staff Report for the 2009 Article IV 
Consultation. Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund. IMF. (2006, February 15). Zimbabwe Pays Its Overdue Financial Obligations to the IMF Under the General Resources Account. Press Release No. 06/33 . IMF. (2005). Zimbabwe: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix, Country Report 
No. 05/359.  Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Bill of 2007. (2007, June 22). 
General Notice 147/2007 . Government Gazette. IRIN News. (2007, November 23). ZIMBABWE:Of Cash and Dealers. Retrieved December 10, 2009 from IRIN Africa|News: http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=75482 Jacobs, R. L. (1977). Hyperinflation and the Supply of Money. Journal of Money, 
Credit and Banking , 9 (2), 287-303. Jonakin, J. (1997). Agrarian Policy. In T. W. Walker (Ed.), Nicaragua without 










Jayson Coomer 62 
Kent, R. (1920). The Edict of Diocletian Fixing Maximum Prices. The University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review (23), 1-30. Keynes, J. M. (1920). The Economic Consequences of the Peace. New York: Harcourt Brace. Keynes, J. M. (1925). The United States and gold. In J. Young, European currency 
and finance (Commission of Gold and Silver Inquiry, United States Senate, serial 9.) (Vol. I, pp. 131-133). Washington: Government Printing Office. Kharas, H., & Pinto, B. (1989). Exchange Rate Rules, Black Market Premia and Fiscal Deficits: The Bolivian Hyperinflation. Review of Economic Studies 56 , 435-448. Khodorchenko, A. (2008). The phenomena, peculiarities and mechanism of the 
parallel/black currency market in Zimbabwe in the years 2006-2008. University of Pretoria, Faculty of Economic and Management Sciences. Pretoria: University of Pretoria. Kiguel, M. A., & Liviatan, N. (1992, October). Stopping Three Big Inflations (Argentina, Brazil, and Peru). Working Paper WPS0999 . Country Economics Department, The World Bank. Kiguel, M., & O'Connell, S. A. (1995). Parallel Exchange Rates in Developing Countries. The World Bank Research Observer, Vol. 10, No. 1 , 21-52. Kovanen, A. (2004, July). Zimbabwe: A Quest for a Nominal Anchor. IMF Working 
Paper WP/04/130 . International Monetary Fund - African Department. Krugman, P. (1979). A Model of Balance of Payments Crises. Journal of Money, 
Credit and Banking , 11 (3), 311-25. Lüthy, H. (1959). La Banque Protestante en France (Vol. 1). Paris: SEVPEN. Lee, J. (2009, February 11). Zimbabwe: Pathology of Inflation. Retrieved December 9, 2009 from Gold News: http://goldnews.bullionvault.com/zimbabwe_inflation_021120091 Lee, S. R., Tang, D. P., & Wong, K. M. (2000). Stock Returns During the German Hyperinflation. The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance 40 , 375-386. Lerner, E. M. (1956). Inflation in the Confederacy, 1861-65. In M. Friedman (Ed.), 
Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money (pp. 163-175). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Lerner, E. M. (1955). Money, Prices and Wages in the Confederacy, 1861-65. 










Jayson Coomer 63 
Mackenzie, G. A., & Stella, P. (1996). Quasi-Fiscal Operations of Public Financial 
Institutions. IMF Occasional Paper No. 142, International Monetary Fund, Washington. Maier, C. S. (1978). The Politics of Inflation in the Twentieth Century. In F. Hirsch, & J. H. Goldthorpe (Eds.), The Political Economy of Inflation (pp. 37-72). London: Martin Robertson. Makinen, G. E. (1986). The Greek Hyperinflation and Stabilization of 1943-1946. 
Journal of Economic History , XLVI (3), 795-805. Makinen, G. E., & Woodward, G. T. (1989). The Taiwanese Hyperinflation and Stabilization of 1945 - 1952. Journal of Money, Credit & Banking, Vol. 21, No. 1 , 90-106. Makochekanwa, A. (2007). A Dynamic Enquiry into the Causes of Hyperinflation in 
Zimbabwe. University of Pretoria. Makochekanwa, A. (2007). Zimbabwe's Inflation Money Demand Model. University of Pretoria. Makochekwana, A. (2007). An Empirical Investigation of Capital Flight from 
Zimbabwe. University of Pretoria. Makochekwana, A. (2007). Zimbabwe's Black Market for Foreign Exchange. University of Pretoria. Makoni, T. A. (2006, August). University of Zimbabwe News. Retrieved October 25, 2009 from Aetiology of Zimbabwe Banking Crisis 2003-4: http://universityofzimbabwenews.blogspot.com/2006/08/aetiology-of-zimbabwe-banking-crisis.html Mark, L. (1982). The View From Hungary. In T. Hammond (Ed.), Witnesses to the 










Jayson Coomer 64 
Oyama, T. (1997, September). Determinants of Stock Prices: The Case of Zimbabwe. IMF Working Paper WP/97/117 . International Monetary Fund - Policy Development and Review Department. Paarlberg, D. (1993). An Analysis and History of Inflation. Westport: Praeger. Pasvolsky, L. (1928). Economic nationalism of the Danubian states. New York: Macmillan. Pazos, F. (1972). Chronic Inflation in Latin America. New York: Praeger Publishers. Persson, T., & Tabellini, G. (1990). Macroeconomic Policy, Credibility and Politics. Chur, Switzerland: Harwood Academic Publishers. 
Petrović, P., & Mladenović, Z. (2000). Money Demand and Exchange Rate Determination under Hyperinflation: Conceptual Issues and Evidence from Yugoslavia. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking , 32 (4), 785-806. 
Petrović, P., Bogetić, Z., & Vujošević, Z. (1999). The Yugoslav Hyperinflation of 1992-1994: Causes, Dynamics and Money Supply Process. Journal of Comparative 










Jayson Coomer 65 
Robertson, J. (2007, March). Exchange Rate Instability: Scarcity-Driven 
Movements Affecting Business Viability. Retrieved July 20, 2007 from http://www.economics.co.zw/ Robinson, P. (2006). Zimbabwe's Hyperinflation: The House is on Fire - But Does 
The Government Know That it is Dousing the Flames with Petrol? Retrieved December 9, 2009 from Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/03894.pdf Sachs, J. (1987). The Bolivian Hyperinflation and Stabilization. American 
Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings), 77 , 279-283. Salemi, M. K. (1979). Adaptive Expectations, Rational Expectations and Money Demand in Hyperinflation Germany. Journal of Monetary Economics (5), 593-604. Salemi, M. K., & Sargent, T. J. (1979). The Demand for Money during Hyperinflation under Rational Expectations: II. International Economic Review (20), 741-758. Sargent, T. J. (1977). The Demand for Money during Hyperinflation under Rational Expectations: I. International Economic Review (18), 59-82. Sargent, T. J. (1982). The Ends of Four Big Inflations. In R. H. Hall (Ed.), Inflation 
Causes and Effects (pp. 41-97). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Sargent, T. J., & Wallace, N. (1973). Rational Expectations and the Dynamics of Hyperinflation. International Economic Review, Vol. 14, No. 2 , 328-350. Siklos, P. (1994a). Establishing Central Bank Independence: Recent Experiences in Developing Countries. Journal of International Trade and Economic 
Development . Siklos, P. L. (Ed.). (1995). Great Inflations of the 20th Century: Theories, Policies 
and Evidence. Waterloo, Ontario: Edward Elgar. Siklos, P. L. (1990). Hyperinflations: Their Origins, Development and Termination (revised). Journal of Economic Surveys , 3 (4), 225-248. Siklos, P. L. (2000, August). Inflation and Hyperinflation. Wilfrid Laurier University. Siklos, P. L. (1994b). Interpreting a Change in Monetary Policy Regimes: A Reappraisal of the First Hungarian Hyperinflation and Stabilization, 1921-28. In M. a. Bordo, Monetary Regimes in Transition (pp. 274-311). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Siklos, P. L. (1989). The End of the Hungarian Hyperinflation of 1945-1946. 











Jayson Coomer 66 
Siklos, P. L. (1991). War Finance, Restruction, Hyperinflation, and Stabilization in 
Hungary 1938-1948. London: Macmillan and St. Martin's Press. Smith, B. (1984). Money and Inflation in Colonial Massachusetts. Minneapolis: Federal Reserve Bulletin. Spechler, M. (1984). Ending Big Inflations: Lessons From Comparative Economic History. Economic Quarterly (Hebrew) (9), 17-35. Statutory Instrument No.21B of 2001. (2001). Stockman, A. C. (1981). Anticipated Inflation and the Capital Stock in a Cash-In-Advance Economy. Journal of Monetary Economics 8 , 387-393. Storch, H. (1823). Cours d'Economie Politique. Paris: Rey & Gravier. Taylor, M. P. (1991). The Hyperinflation Model of Money Demand Revisited. 
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 23, No. 3 , 327-351. The Mail and Guardian (SA). (2006, December 22). Report: Zim to discuss $2bn 
loan from China. Retrieved Decmber 09, 2009 from The Zimbabwe Situation: http://www.zimbabwesituation.com/dec23_2006.html The Zimbabwean. (2006, September 28). Farm Invasions Continue. Retrieved December 09, 2009 from The Zimbabwe Situation: http://www.zimbabwesituation.com/sep28a_2006.html Tibaijuka, A. K. (2005, July 18). Report of the Fact-Finding Mission to Zimbabwe to 
Assess the Scope and Impact of Operation Murambatsvina by the UN Special Envoy 
on Human Settlements Issues in Zimbabwe. From http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/zimbabwe/zimbabwe_rpt.pdf 
TIMELINE: Chronology of Zimbabwe's Economic Crisis. (2007, September 19). Retrieved October 9, 2009 from Thomson Reuters: http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSL1992587420070919?pageNumber=1&virtualBrandChannel=0 
Timeline: Zimbabwe. (2009, August 3). Retrieved September 9, 2009 from BBC NEWS: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/country_profiles/1831470.stm Végh, C. A. (1992). Stopping High Inflation: An Analytical Overview. International 










Jayson Coomer 67 
Young, J. (1925). European currency and finance. Vols. 1 and 2. (Commission of 
Gold and Silver Inquiry, United States Senate, serial 9.). Washington: Government Printing Office.  
   
